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Abstract
In everyday confabulation and rationalisation of behaviour, agents provide sincerely believed explanations of behaviour which 
are ill-grounded and normally inaccurate. In this paper, I look at the commonalities and differences between confabulations 
and rationalisations and investigate their moral costs and benefits. Following Summers and Velleman, I argue that both can 
be beneficial because they constrain future behaviour through self-consistency motivations. However, I then show that the 
same features that make confabulations and rationalisations beneficial in some cases can also make them morally costly, 
when behaviour is explained and justified through the endorsement of bad moral principles. I show that these effects are 
most likely to occur where the central element of confabulation, self-explanation, and the central element of rationalisation, 
self-justification, coincide.
Keywords Confabulation · Rationalisation · Sel-justification · Self-explanation · Morality
1 Introduction
When we confabulate, we sincerely report something that 
we take to be true, but our claim is ill grounded and, in most 
cases of confabulation, not in fact true. Some definitions 
(Fotopoulou 2009) limit confabulations to memory distor-
tions. Broader definitions “encompass any type of false or 
unjustified belief” (Bortolotti and Cox 2009). Classic cases 
of confabulation are inaccurate memory reports of past 
events, or, more relevantly for the paper at hand, inaccurate 
explanations for what we have done, where our explanations 
do not link to the facts adequately. Whether these kinds of 
confabulations are best described as false memories or as 
inferences about past motivations need not concern us here.
Confabulation is by definition an epistemically prob-
lematic activity: individuals are unable to recall their past 
actions and motivations but confidently make assertions 
about these.1 When we confabulate, we lack knowledge 
about our own past, but also self-knowledge, because we 
mistakenly attribute certain past emotions, beliefs etc. to 
ourselves (Strijbos and de Bruin 2015). The concept of con-
fabulation has its original home in clinical cases, for exam-
ple in amnesic patients. There is some debate on how broad 
the notion of confabulation should be and what the relevant 
differences between confabulation in the clinicial and non-
clinical population are (Bortolotti and Cox 2009).
In this paper, I will only be concerned with a small subset 
of non-clinical confabulations and rationalisations. I will be 
looking at what Lisa Bortolotti calls ‘everyday confabula-
tions’ (Bortolotti 2018), where agents give justifications for 
behaviour which are normally false and insufficiently or not 
at all supported by the evidence available to the agent. More 
specifically still, I will be interested in moral rationalisations 
and confabulations, instances where we give an explanation 
for past behaviour by citing moral reasons for said behav-
iour, when the claim that these moral reasons were what in 
fact motivated our action is not justified by the evidence. In 
other words, the agent confabulates certain moral motives 
when explaining their past behaviour. I will show both bene-
fits and costs of confabulation and rationalisation, and argue 
that rationalisations which are also confabulations are most 
likely to have either a strong positive or negative effect on 
future moral conduct. Whether the effect is positive or nega-
tive does not depend on the inaccuracy of the rationalisation, 
but on the moral principles endorsed in giving it.
The paper is structured as follows—I first introduce the 
notions of rationalisation and confabulation and ask whether 
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we can draw a principled distinction between these two. I 
will argue that while there are cases of pure confabulation, 
where the main goal is self-explanation, and cases of pure 
rationalisation which are only geared at self-justification, the 
two phenomena often coincide.
I then turn to the benefits of confabulation. Summers 
(2017) has recently argued that there are some benefits to 
rationalisation and confabulation in the moral realm. I will 
show that Summers is correct and—drawing on his work and 
that of David Velleman—I will delineate the kinds of cases 
where we should expect rationalisation and confabulation to 
have beneficial effects on agents’ moral conduct.
However, I then show the flipside of these mechanisms. 
While Summers focuses on the positive effects,2 I argue that 
the same kinds of mechanisms can also lead to negative con-
sequences. Rationalisation and confabulation can have con-
siderable moral costs when they reinforce bad moral argu-
ments and justifications. In some cases, when we explain 
moral behaviour to ourselves and others in such a way as to 
make ourselves look good, a central characteristic of moti-
vated reasoning and cognition, this can lead to skewed moral 
judgment: rather than adjusting our behaviour to our stand-
ards, we adjust our standards to our behaviour. The same 
mechanisms of self-consistency and self-enhancement that 
lead to positive results can have detrimental results. And, 
importantly, it is not the fact that confabulations and ration-
alisations are false at the time of adoption or that they are 
sometimes enlisted in order to retain a positive self-image 
that makes them morally costly. Both of these features can 
drive positive effects. It is only when they coincide with bad 
moral justifications that things go seriously wrong. Finally, I 
turn to the question whether confabulation is less susceptible 
to this kind of problem, because it does not rely on the same 
kinds of motivations as rationalisation. I conclude that it 
is when confabulation and rationalisation coincide that we 
will have the strongest effects, be they positive or negative.
2  Confabulation and Rationalisation
2.1  Introducing the Phenomena
In this section, I introduce the notions of confabulation and 
rationalisation and explain important similarities and dif-
ferences between them. The cases of confabulation I am 
interested in for the purposes of this paper are ones where 
we give explanations for our beliefs, decisions, or actions 
which are not well supported by the available evidence and, 
at least normally, untrue. Probably the most famous example 
comes from Nisbett and Wilson’s studies reported in a 1977 
paper. In two studies, participants were asked to evaluate 
the quality of different nightgowns or identical nylon tights, 
and their choices were best explained by a placement effect, 
they always evaluated the items furthest to the right highest. 
However, when asked to explain their choices, they said they 
had chosen the items of clothing because of their colour, 
the superior knitting or similar (Nisbett and Wilson 1977). 
Because the real reasons for action were not introspectively 
accessible to participants, they confabulated an explanation.3 
This does not mean that the reasons they confabulated were 
random. They can be seen as a kind of inference to the best 
explanation, where participants came up with explanations 
which were plausible in the light of criteria one might well 
apply when choosing items of clothing.
Similarly, there are cases of confabulation in moral judg-
ment. In fact, Jonathan Haidt claims that moral reason giving 
generally is confabulation, because the real drivers of moral 
judgments are not the ones we appeal to when giving reasons 
for our moral judgments. According to Haidt (2001), we 
make moral judgments based on emotions, and the moral 
theories we use to explain our judgments are confabulations. 
He illustrates this with an example, where people are given 
a vignette of a couple of siblings who engage in sex which, 
according to the vignette, is a one off event which does no 
psychological harm and does not lead to pregnancy because 
they use contraceptives. Haidt points out that even though 
general principles that would make incest wrong (for exam-
ple risk of birth defects, risk of psychological damage) are 
excluded by the way the example is constructed, people still 
believe that the action is wrong and put forward these kinds 
of reasons when justifying their judgment. When faced with 
the objection that the general principles do not apply, they 
are unable to come up with an alternative explanation for 
the wrongness of incest in this particular case. According to 
Haidt, they are confabulating an explanation for their moral 
judgment, even though the real underlying reason is a gut 
emotional reaction.4
A core feature of confabulation is that the correct expla-
nation for our behaviour is not available to us. Things are 
slightly different in cases of rationalisation, where alter-
native explanations may be available to the agent, but are 
not endorsed. Haidt’s case is at the boundary between 
2 It is important to note here that Summers does not deny that there 
may well be negative effects, they just aren’t the focus of his paper.
3 Note that we can sometimes tell that an explanation is likely to 
be a confabulation even if we do not know what the real underlying 
reasons for actions were, because the explanation is supported by 
obviously self-serving or biased reasoning. I thank an anonymous 
reviewer for pointing this out.
4 Much more could be said about Haidt’s interpretation of the experi-
mental results and whether they establish his general claim. For cur-
rent purposes, it is sufficient that his interpretation gives us a model 
of what confabulation in the moral realm might look like.
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rationalisation and confabulation, as ‘it just feels wrong’ 
may be an explanation introspectively available to the indi-
vidual, but it is certainly not considered satisfactory.
Rationalisation is not just employed to explain a moral 
judgment, it is also a common way of justifying past deci-
sions or intended actions. This can be illustrated by the fol-
lowing example. I am set to meet a friend at the tube station. 
On leaving the station, I walk past a beggar, who is sitting 
out in the icy rain. I do not give him any money. I then see 
my friend emerging from the tube; he stops and gives the 
beggar money before he joins me in the doorway where I am 
waiting for him. The contrast between our behaviour leads 
me to consider why I did not give money. It may also lead 
to cognitive dissonance, because it threatens my self-view 
as generous and caring. In this situation, I might come up 
with the following rationalisation: “I should not give money 
to the beggar because he would just go and buy drugs with 
it anyway. It’s got nothing to do with being stingy or uncar-
ing.” What we have here is a rationalisation of my behaviour 
such as to make it seem morally acceptable.
Rationalisations need not be moral rationalisations, 
they can also be used to avoid the threat of seeming to be 
irrational or violating prudential norms. So, for example, I 
might rationalise the purchase of expensive shoes by saying 
that I was not really being extravagant. as the shoes will last 
longer and be worn more often than cheaper shoes, and are 
therefore a good investment. Here, I am just trying to show 
that I am meeting a standard for spending money in such a 
way that it benefits me most, and thereby meeting a rational-
ity standard in my purchase.
2.2  The Difference Between Confabulation 
and Rationalisation
Let us now focus on the differences between confabulation 
and rationalisation. At first glance, it would seem that ration-
alisation and confabulation are different in ways that are rel-
evant to their epistemic and moral evaluation. Confabulation 
is a response to ignorance, where individuals confidently 
fill the gaps by either confabulating past events (memory 
confabulations) or confabulating explanations for past or 
present behaviour. While confabulation is generally under-
stood as epistemically problematic because the confabulated 
beliefs are unwarranted and normally untrue, confabulations 
are attempts to avoid admitting ignorance, rather than being 
attempts to avoid a certain truth that is in principle available 
to us (cf Bortolotti 2018).
By contrast, rationalisation looks like an instance of moti-
vated cognition. In motivated cognition, we reason in such a 
way as to achieve certain beliefs that are subjectively desir-
able, or in such a way as to avoid subjectively undesirable 
beliefs, or both (Hughes and Zaki 2015). For example, posi-
tive illusions, where individuals exhibit an unrealistically 
positive self-image—also known as the better than aver-
age effect—(Taylor 1989), or have unrealistically positive 
expectations for the future, are classic cases of motivated 
cognition. In these cases of motivated cognition, evidence is 
selected in a biased way, so as to reach certain subjectively 
desirable conclusions. In the example above, we can see the 
rationalisation of not giving money to the beggar working 
in the following way: I want to avoid the conclusion that 
my actions are uncaring and morally questionable, or even 
immoral. I therefore recruit the thought that beggars often 
use money to buy drugs as a reason to justify my action.
2.2.1  Self‑Explanation and Self‑Justification
One important thing to note is that rationalisation can serve 
two purposes. In the case presented above, I can use the 
claim ‘beggars use money they are given to finance their 
drug consumption’ as a moral justification, without claim-
ing that this was in fact the reason why I didn’t give money. 
I could, for example, say, “The reason I didn’t give money 
was because I was cold and it was inconvenient to dig out 
my wallet in the rain. However, as it happens, this was also 
the correct thing to do, because the beggar would have only 
spent the money on drugs anyway, and I would not really 
have been benefiting him.” Alternatively, and more com-
monly, I could claim that the justification of my action was 
also my reason for acting the way I did at the time.
Summers characterizes rationalisation as providing the 
agent both with a justification and an explanation for their 
behaviour. “The rationalizer offers a justification of her own 
action as if it were an explanation of her action.” (Summers 
2017, p. S21) Self-explanation and self-justification often 
coincide, when I explain my actions in such a way that my 
explanation of my motivating reasons for action also justifies 
that action. I may well not have thought about whether or not 
to give money to the beggar, and only feel the need to access 
and question my motivations when I see my friend giving 
money to the beggar. But once I feel the need to explain my 
behaviour, I explain it in such a way that makes sense of my 
behaviour (self-explanation) while at the same time justify-
ing it (self-justification). It takes a special kind of detach-
ment to say “I didn’t give money because it was inconven-
ient, but as it happens, that is also the right thing to do.” It 
seems to make the rightness of my action accidental, which 
is something most people will feel uncomfortable with.
Nevertheless, in rationalisation, justification and expla-
nation can, and in some cases do, come apart, as the above 
example shows. Only when a rationalisation also serves the 
purpose of self-explanation will it be an instance of con-
fabulation. Focusing on the two goals of self-justification 
and self-explanation, we can draw a preliminary distinction. 
Confabulation primarily serves the purpose of self-expla-
nation, whereas rationalisation is primarily concerned with 
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self-justification. (Moral) rationalisation can be successful 
even if it only serves the purpose of self-justification, self-
explanation is, as it were, optional.
By contrast, the kinds of everyday confabulation cases 
we have been considering are best characterised as attempts 
at self-explanation. In a recent paper, Coltheart (2017) 
even argues that all confabulation, whether clinical or non-
clinical, derives from a feature of human cognition that he 
calls ‘the drive for causal understanding’. I take no stance 
on whether this is true for all instances of confabulation, 
including false memory reports, but it is almost trivially a 
feature of confabulations which explain past decisions and 
behaviour.
However, there is frequently also an element of self-
justification in confabulation. Successful self-explanation 
does not just require there to be any kind of story, it requires 
a story that makes sense of one’s behaviour and makes it 
appear rational or moral. One wants to meet certain epis-
temic or moral standards when explaining one’s actions. ‘I 
don’t know’ is not a satisfactory explanation for one’s behav-
iour, but neither is ‘I felt like it’ or ‘I was in a good mood’, 
because these explanations (while they may actually be true) 
do not really provide reasons, they are at most causes. This 
is why the participants in Haidt’s study do not settle for ‘it 
just feels wrong’ when explaining their judgment that incest 
is wrong even in the carefully designed vignette they are 
presented with.
Rationalisations can therefore at the same time be con-
fabulations in cases where individuals are rationalising to fill 
a gap and to explain their past behaviour to themselves. For 
those who are unhappy with merging the concepts of con-
fabulation and rationalisation in this way, an alternative way 
of making this point is to say that some instances of sincere 
but mistaken explanations of behaviour can be construed 
either as rationalisations or as confabulations.
While self-justification plays a role in confabulation as 
well, it seems at first glance that pure confabulation is, at 
least from a moral point of view, less suspect than confabula-
tion which involves rationalisation, because it is more open 
to different kinds of explanations for behaviour. While the 
individual does not want to admit ignorance with respect to 
the reasons and causes for their decisions and actions, they 
are not set on a certain explanation that makes them appear 
in a favourable light, anything that makes sense of their deci-
sions would in principle do. However, what makes sense is 
plausibly constrained by certain rationality standards, which 
then shape confabulations.
3  Moral Benefits of Confabulation 
and Rationalisation
Summers argues that confabulation and rationalisation can 
have moral benefits because they put pressure on individuals 
to act consistently with self-ascribed motives.5 In what fol-
lows, I will focus on those rationalisations which also count 
as confabulations because they arise from the need to fill a 
gap in the person’s understanding of their own behaviour. 
To illustrate the benefits of rationalisation, Summers also 
employs the example of a beggar, but in the scenario he 
describes, a person gives money to the beggar because they 
are actually afraid of him. However, they do not access that 
reason and rationalise that it is good to give to people in 
need. This rationalisation, Summers claims, can have posi-
tive knock-on effects by putting pressure on subjects to act in 
accordance with the self-avowed motive for action in future.
I now put practical pressure on myself—insofar as I 
care about or am committed to being a reasonable, 
consistent, and moral person who treats likes alike—
to defend this as a good reason and act according to 
it in future cases, or at least to distinguish apparently 
similar cases so that I can still claim to have consistent 
motives. If I turn the corner and walk past yet another 
person who appears similarly in need, I will feel some 
pressure to do one of the following: give to him as 
well, distinguish the cases (“This person doesn’t actu-
ally seem to be suffering”), or add some nuance to the 
reason I previously endorsed (“... when I have extra 
cash in my wallet.”) (Summers 2017, p. S29).
The idea that self-consistency motivations have a positive 
influence on future action can be found in other writers as 
well. Velleman (2000) stresses the importance of the self-
consistency motivation for making us behave in accordance 
with certain traits or motivations we self-ascribe. In sum-
marizing psychological literature on cognitive dissonance, 
self enhancement, self verification and self consistency, he 
says: “The research appears to show that we tend to act in 
accordance with the motives and traits of character that we 
perceive ourselves as having” (Velleman 2000, p. 362, 363). 
Leon Festinger, the founder of cognitive dissonance theory, 
also saw the need for cognitive consistency as a core human 
motive (Gawronski 2012).
Self-consistency motivations and the avoidance of cog-
nitive dissonance are known to drive rationalisations and 
reinterpretations of past behaviour. In a famous experiment 
by Festinger and Carlsmith (1959), students were asked to do 
a boring task (sorting spools) and were then split into three 
5 Summers also lists meaningfulness as a further benefit of rationali-
sation, I will not discuss that issue here.
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groups. The control group were debriefed straight away. One 
experimental group was asked to introduce the task to the 
next participant and claim that it was a lot of fun. They were 
given one dollar for doing this. The second experimental 
group was also asked to introduce the task and claim that 
it was fun, but received 20 dollars as compensation. In a 
debrief, it turned out that when participants were later asked 
how enjoyable they found the task, the control group and 
the 20 dollar group reported not finding it enjoyable, with 
the control group reporting least enjoyment. The one dollar 
group, by contrast, reported finding it enjoyable. Festinger 
and Carlsmith explain this by saying that there is more cog-
nitive dissonance pressure for the one dollar than the 20 
dollar group, because the higher payment provides the 20 
dollar group with a plausible motivation and explanation 
for claiming the task was interesting. They therefore do not 
have to reduce cognitive dissonance in the way the one dol-
lar group does. Characterising the task as enjoyable can be 
interpreted as an implicit rationalisation for doing something 
that they have no obvious motivation to do.
But, importantly in the current context, consistency moti-
vations also constrain behaviour looking forward. According 
to Velleman, we act as we do in order to retain a consist-
ent self-image. This consistency is crucial for us to make 
sense of ourselves. The agent acts in accordance with an 
existing self-image in order to know what they are going 
to do (Velleman 2000, p. 366). In some cases of confabula-
tion and rationalisation, this can have positive effects on our 
behaviour, because we will try to act in ways that fit with 
our image of ourselves as people who help those in need, or 
people who are honest etc. These kinds of considerations 
make it seem that rationalisations that construe our behav-
iour in a morally positive light are desirable, because they 
will constrain our behaviour by making us want to act in 
accordance with our professed motives and values. In the 
quote by Summers above, we can see how professed rea-
sons for action and moral commitments produce pressure 
to act in accordance with these. This is also what cognitive 
dissonance theory teaches us. In the study by Festinger and 
Carlsmith, cognitive dissonance was reduced post hoc, but 
it is also possible to preempt cognitive dissonance by acting 
in accordance with the values we profess to have.
The effect of labelling on future behaviour extends to 
labels others apply to us as well. Studies with children have 
shown that labelling them as tidy has a more positive effect 
on their tidiness than impressing on them the importance 
of tidiness (Miller et al. 1975), and that telling children that 
they are generous makes them more likely to behave gener-
ously in future (Holte et al. 1984). These kinds of findings 
suggest that attributions of positive traits and motives will 
influence behaviour in such a way that people will act in 
accordance with these attributions, whether they are self-
generated or given to us by others.
Self-consistency motivations are however not the only 
forces at work when we try to live up to our professed moral 
principles. Self-enhancement motives also play a positive 
role in motivating individuals to live up to positive attri-
butions. Thus, in the cases where others ascribe positive 
attributes to individuals as in the studies cited above, one 
motivation for acting in accordance with the description of 
oneself as tidy or generous will be the desire to retain a 
positive self-image. The children who are labelled as tidy 
and then behave accordingly want to be able to apply posi-
tively valued traits to themselves and are therefore driven by 
self-enhancement motives. A further motivation here may 
be that we want others to retain their positive image of us, 
so the motivation is one of wanting external approval rather 
than internal consistency or validation. But these further 
motivations are compatible with the hypothesis that others’ 
belief in us as, e.g. ‘generous’, reinforces that specific posi-
tive self-conception6 and thereby supports behaviour that is 
in line with that self-conception. An important difference 
between positive self-attributions and positive attributions 
made by others is that the standards of what actually consti-
tutes good behaviour are public in the latter case, whereas 
the individual has far more leeway in the way they define 
desirable behaviour when attributing positive characteristics, 
motives or actions to themselves. I will return to this issue 
in Sect. 4. However, in as far as agents do endorse moral 
self-descriptions which commit them to specific values and 
corresponding types of behaviour, such as giving to charity 
regularly, visiting their friends when they are ill, not eating 
meat because they care about animals, being a reliable col-
leagues who answers e-mails on time, these self-ascriptions 
will put pressure on them to behave in accordance with their 
self-conception from a self-consistency motivation. The 
pressure to live up to our own rationalisations will be even 
higher if these are made public, if we endorse them in front 
of others.
These considerations suggest that rationalisations in 
which we endorse certain moral values or principles as driv-
ing our behaviour will facilitate behaving in accordance with 
moral values, as self-consistency motives and self-enhance-
ment motivations put pressure on the individual to live up 
to their professed values. Self-consistency will lead us to 
act in a way that fits our existing self-image in order to help 
us make sense of ourselves and the world. Our need for a 
morally positive self image constrains our space of available 
actions and motivates us to act in accordance with what we 
believe to be right, so that we can maintain a positive moral 
6 For example, Murray et al. (1996) found that when one partner had 
an unrealistically positive view of their romantic partner, this tended 
to affect the other partner’s self-image over time, which also became 
increasingly positive.
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self-image. Clearly, self-consistency and self-enhancement 
are only two of the factors that will be at work, so we should 
not expect a perfect fit between self-professed values and 
actual behaviour, but we should expect them to have some 
constraining power.7
Furthermore, and more speculatively, our moral self-
image may have an indirect effect on what we feel morally 
obligated to do. If we assume that ought implies can, then 
being morally incompetent releases us from moral obliga-
tions. People frequently use their personal limitations, such 
as for example illnesses, as excuses for not meeting moral 
expectations others may have of them (Pickard 2011). This 
need not be disingenuous. On the plausible assumption that 
we cannot have moral obligations that we are unable to meet, 
a self-conception as a person who does not care about the 
well-being of others, or someone whose behaviour is driven 
by addiction, makes an individual feel unable to meet moral 
demands. This, in turn, will make them unlikely to try to 
meet them. We therefore need to be able to tell stories about 
our behaviour which emphasize our agency, rather than por-
traying us as compelled by forces such as addiction or disor-
der. Sometimes, a positive rationalisation or confabulation 
will open up space for the adoption of certain motives for 
action in a way that a more realistic self-assessment would 
not. If we are concerned with the effects of rationalisation, 
it does not matter so much that these rationalisations are 
untrue at the time of adoption. What matters is that they 
allow us to shape ourselves in a better way going forward.
Self-narratives which emphasize our moral failings risk 
being self-defeating, by making it seem impossible to act 
from moral motivations. This can range from extremely 
determinist narratives which deny agency and moral capac-
ity, to more mildly self-defeating views on one’s own behav-
iour. For example, when we accurately explain our own 
behaviour to ourselves by saying ‘I did not give to the beggar 
because I don’t much care about the plight of others’ or ‘I 
did not stand up to the bully because I am a bit of a coward’ 
this may well be accurate, and we are not claiming that we 
could not act from different, more moral motivations. But 
it would probably be more beneficial for our future behav-
iour if we are less honest with ourselves. In some cases, 
inaccurate self-reports which are instances of confabulation 
or self-justification may actually be preferable in terms of 
bolstering our moral agency.
4  Costs of Rationalisation 
and Confabulation—The Distortion 
of Moral Judgment
It is tempting to conclude from the above discussion that 
we can confabulate and rationalise all we like in the moral 
domain, and that as long as we end up with explanations 
which justify what we do as moral, it will all be to the good, 
because this allows us to become better persons. Unfortu-
nately, this conclusion is unjustified. Put very simply, the 
effects will only be as good as the moral principles the 
rationalisation appeals to. What matters is not how accu-
rately the justification provides the agent’s actual motives, 
but how good the justification is in terms of picking out good 
moral principles, i.e. whether it is an objectively good moral 
justification and the individual would be morally justified if 
this had indeed been their reason for action. This characteri-
sation of course raises a further issue, which is whether there 
are correct and incorrect moral justifications. Resolving this 
question is beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, I will 
just assume that we can get it wrong morally. As a work-
ing hypothesis, moral principles which do not generalise or 
ignore the well-being of others should be rejected.
Not all instances of confabulation and rationalisation 
that show us in a morally positive light are actually morally 
defensible. Rather, rationalisations can attempt to justify 
behaviour that should not be justified. Take, once again, the 
example from the beginning, where I don’t give to the beggar 
and justify this by saying that beggars spend all their money 
on drugs anyway. This rationalisation of my behaviour is 
also a rationalisation of not helping a certain subset of those 
in need, beggars, in a certain way, by giving them money. 
Leaving aside the question whether this is a justified moral 
stance to take, it is clear that these kinds of rationalisations 
can have a severely negative impact on our moral judgment 
and decision making, because they provide a justification 
for not helping others, in this case based on some empirical 
assumptions about the likely effects.
The claim that not all moral self-justifications and ration-
alisations are defensible is hardly a novel one: Shakespeare 
caricatures this kind of moral self-justification, in Julius 
Caesar (Shakespeare 1988). In the play, Caesar’s killers 
rationalise their murder, claiming that they are doing Caesar 
a favour by freeing him from the fear of death:
BRUTUS
Fates, we will know your pleasures:
That we shall die, we know; ‘tis but the time
And drawing days out, that men stand upon.
CASSIUS
Why, he that cuts off twenty years of life
Cuts off so many years of fearing death.
BRUTUS
7 Strijbos and DeBruin (2015) point out that we may have to manage 
our behaviour in a number of ways by setting external incentives and 
constraints to live up to our self-professed values. Avowal of these 
values may not be enough, but it guides further steps we take to shape 
our behaviour.
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Grant that, and then is death a benefit:
So are we Caesar’s friends, that have abridged
His time of fearing death. (Act 3, Scene 1)
While this is not meant to be a psychologically realistic 
instance of self-justification,8 it does illustrate something 
important about the ubiquity and importance of the self-
justification motive. The urge to put a positive spin on our 
actions that makes them appear acceptable is a strong one, 
and it can influence our moral judgments. In a discussion of 
self-enhancement and self-protection, Alicke and Sedikides 
point to ways in which we alter our perception and interpre-
tation of events when we cannot reach a positive self-image 
by making changes in the external world: “When people can-
not promote themselves objectively, they have recourse to 
construal mechanisms such as reinterpreting the meaning of 
social or task feedback, misremembering or reconstructing 
events in a self-serving way, and making excuses for poor 
behaviour or performance” (Alicke and Sedikides 2009).
Our moral compass is susceptible to being skewed by 
mechanisms of self-justification, especially when we adjust 
our judgments of what we deem acceptable gradually 
through post hoc rationalisations. Existing standards can be 
eroded in the attempt to find a post hoc or advance justi-
fication for unethical behaviour in a process of cognitive 
dissonance reduction. Changes in our perception of what 
constitutes acceptable behaviour can often take the form of 
a slow slide down a slippery slope. We begin by justifying 
a small departure from ethical conduct: “everyone lies in 
a situation like that”. And once this type of behaviour has 
come to be perceived as acceptable, more serious lies get 
justified as not being so different from what one has already 
declared acceptable, and so on.9 LaFollette remarks: “[t]
hinking that bad behavior will probably cause worse behav-
ior is not surprising: it is precisely what one would expect 
given our habitual natures” (LaFollette 2005).
It is interesting to note that these real-life slippery slope 
events are relevantly different from empirical slippery slope 
arguments put forward in ethical and policy debates, because 
the first step onto the slope need not be perceived as accept-
able. Rather, there are pressures which make this course of 
action seem attractive (or less unattractive than the alterna-
tives), and the moral evaluation is made to follow suit.10 We 
do what we may initially believe to be wrong and rationalise 
it post hoc. This leaves us with a more permissive approach 
to a specific issue with the potential to become even more 
permissive if there are further motivations to do what we 
had initially believed wrong and we become habituated to 
this kind of behaviour.
What I have just described gives us a mechanism how 
self-enhancement motivations can lead to bad rationalisa-
tions. These in turn can reinforce bad behaviour by taking 
moral pressure off the individual, who feels morally justified 
in their action. If the behaviour is embraced or defended as 
acceptable, it is likely to be reinforced by self-consistency 
motives.
In his book on moral disengagement, the psychologist 
Albert Bandura claims that ‘People do not usually engage 
in harmful conduct until they have justified to themselves 
the morality of their actions’ (Bandura 2016). However, 
people do sometimes spontaneously act in ways that violate 
their moral standards. They also sometimes act in situations 
that they do not yet have a moral standard for, because they 
haven’t considered them from a moral perspective. I take it 
that Bandura would not disagree, but rather, that his point 
is that if we do consider the moral character of our action 
before we act, we will find a way to justify it to ourselves 
before we perform the action. But we do not always consider 
the morality or the harmfulness of our actions prior to act-
ing. Bandura’s 2016 book on moral disengagement is replete 
with examples of planned action where agents rationalise 
their behaviour as morally acceptable. Thus, for example, 
he looks at the cover-up of child abuse within the catholic 
church, citing church officials who justified covering up indi-
viduals misdeeds by appeal to the damage it would do to the 
authority of the church if these matters came to light. These 
types of justification can be, and have been, recruited either 
before or after embarking on morally dubious behaviour. 
In either case, they illustrate the downside of rationalisa-
tion. This can be rationalisation which is also confabula-
tion, where we try to explain our own behaviour to ourselves 
because we are genuinely trying to figure out our reason for 
action. But it may also be pure rationalisations, where we 
are trying to explain away unwelcome motives.
8 Note also that this is one of the cases where motive and (the cari-
cature of) self-justification come apart, the motive for killing Caesar 
was political.
9 Tenbrunsel et al. (2010) describe a similar scenario, where a con-
sultant becomes habituated to overbilling their clients. At the start, 
the amount is so small that it does not register on their moral com-
pass and, incrementally, the amount of time the consultant charges for 
become larger and larger.
10 In contrast, slippery slope arguments which are put forward in pol-
icy debates often assume, at least for the sake of argument, that the 
action is considered is not problematic in and of itself, but will lead to 
problematic consequences. For an overview on factors that influence 
both empirical predictions and the likelihood of slippery slope events 
occurring, see Jefferson (2014).
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5  Conclusion
We find ourselves in rather an odd place. Following argu-
ments by Velleman and Summers, I have shown that there 
are possible benefits to rationalisation and confabulation, 
and that they can have a positive effect on our moral con-
duct. I have argued that what makes rationalisation and 
confabulation problematic—when they are problematic—
is not their falsity or lack of warrant, nor that they stem 
from the desire to make ourselves appear in a positive 
light. In fact, the self-enhancement motive can be a posi-
tive thing because it makes us try to live up to a desirable 
moral self-image. If the explanation and justification we 
give for our behaviour is one that embraces good moral 
principles, such as being honest, helping those in need or 
similar, they are likely to lead to good results. This is true 
even if the self-ascribed moral motive, e.g. benevolence, 
was not actually driving our behaviour at the time of action 
and our explanation is therefore strictly speaking false as 
an explanation of past behaviour.
What makes rationalisation problematic is the fact that 
there can be rationalisations for an action which satisfy 
the agent that their action is morally justified when it is 
not, and allow him to adopt self-serving moral principles, 
for example ‘We do not need to help the poor as they have 
brought their plight on themselves.’ This has further nega-
tive effects by leaving the agent with bad moral principles 
and making future immoral behaviour more likely via self-
consistency pressures.
Is this a danger which affects confabulation and ration-
alisation equally? I have argued earlier that where we have 
a justificatory gap and the agent aims both at self-justifica-
tion and at self-explanation, confabulation and rationalisa-
tion coincide. It is in these cases where there is a motiva-
tional element of self-justification in a confabulation that 
the effects, be they positive or negative, will be strongest, 
because the justificatory element is at the forefront. This 
means that these cases of rationalisation involving con-
fabulation are more likely to lead to positive or negative 
effects. If we adopt a rationalisation that is incorrect but 
reinforces desirable moral values, this is good for our long 
term moral development and conduct, even if it shows lack 
of self-knowledge at the time. If we come up with a ration-
alisation that justifies immoral behaviour as moral, then 
this is bad for us as moral agents, because it will lead us 
to continue behaving in that way.
By contrast, there can be a confabulation which explains 
our behaviour to us without at the same time justifying 
it. In fact, we may think that our behaviour was unjus-
tified. For example, I may refuse to loan a friend who 
needs money for a business venture money and, in a self-
accusatory mood, think this is because I have always been 
slightly envious of them and their entrepreneurial spirit. In 
reality, however, I am just worried about my own finances 
and the possibility of suffering financial loss. Because I 
have not tried to find a moral justification for my behav-
iour, be it an objectively good one or a misguided one, 
there is no consistency-pressure for me to act up to a spe-
cific moral principle I endorse.
Frequently, the need for self-explanation and self-justi-
fication coincide, especially in cases of moral confabula-
tion and rationalisation. But to the extent that confabula-
tion is primarily geared towards self-explanation, it is less 
likely to affect moral agency to quite the same degree as 
rationalisation.
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